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BOND V. UNITED STATES 
Supreme Court Holds Chemical Weapons Convention  
Implementation Act Inapplicable to Jilted Wife’s  
Attempt to Injure Husband’s Lover  
Dean M. Nickles* 
I. CASE FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Petitioner Carol Bond was a microbiologist from Pennsylvania.  Mrs. 
Bond’s husband had been having an affair with her friend, Myrlinda 
Haynes, who became pregnant by Mr. Bond in 2006.  After learning the 
details of the affair, Mrs. Bond attempted sought revenge against Ms. 
Haynes.  She ordered one chemical (potassium dichromate) over the 
Internet, stole a second chemical from her workplace, and over the course 
of eight months, Mrs. Bond on numerous occasions went to Ms. Haynes’ 
home and spread the chemicals in locations with which Ms. Haynes was 
likely to come into contact, including her mailbox.  Due to the visible 
nature of the chemicals, all but one of Mrs. Bond’s attempts were 
unsuccessful, and Ms. Haynes suffered only a minor chemical burn in the 
successful attempt.  It is undisputed that Mrs. Bond did not intend to kill 
Ms. Haynes, but was simply attempting to give her an uncomfortable rash.  
While the local authorities did not respond to Ms. Haynes’s requests for 
assistance, the post office responded to the alleged tampering with Ms. 
Haynes’ mailbox and placed surveillance cameras.  These cameras 
recorded Mrs. Bond stealing an envelope and placing chemicals in the 
muffler of Ms. Haynes’s car.1 
Federal prosecutors charged Mrs. Bond with two counts of mail theft, 
as well as two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon in 
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 1  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014). 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a), the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act.  Mrs. Bond filed a motion to dismiss the chemical 
weapons counts on the grounds that they exceeded Congress’ powers and 
violated the Tenth Amendment; the district court denied the motion.2  The 
district court accepted Mrs. Bond’s conditional guilty plea, sentenced her to 
six years imprisonment, and ordered her to pay a $2,000 fine and $9,902.79 
in restitution.3  Mrs. Bond then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit on Tenth Amendment grounds, and the court of appeals 
agreed with the government that she lacked standing to bring this 
challenge.  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2011, however, 
the government confessed error, stating that it had changed its position, and 
the case was reversed and remanded to the Third Circuit.  On remand, the 
Third Circuit rejected Mrs. Bond’s arguments that her conduct was not 
among the “warlike” activities Congress designed the statute to prohibit 
and that section 229 exceeded Congress’ powers.4  At no stage in this case 
did the government attempt to use the Commerce Clause as justification for 
the statute.5  The Supreme Court again granted certiorari in 2014.6 
II. HOLDING OF THE CASE 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that section 229 
did not cover Mrs. Bond’s conduct in this case.7  The Chief Justice begins 
by discussing the federal nature of the U.S. government, the general 
principle that the states “have broad authority to enact legislation for the 
public good—often called a ‘police power,’”8 and that usually the national 
government cannot legislate in this area.  Although the government often 
uses the Commerce Clause to defend its power to legislate in this area, the 
government could not make that argument here.9  Despite the parties 
spending significant time over constitutional questions surrounding the 
Necessary and Proper Clause and the treaty power, the majority found itself 
able to resolve the case on other grounds.10 
 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. at 2086. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. at 2087. 
 6  Id. at 2086. 
 7  Id. at 2093. 
 8  Id. at 2086 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)). 
 9  Id. at 2087 (stating that “the Court of Appeals held that the Government had 
explicitly disavowed that argument before the District Court”). 
 10  Id. (asserting “it is ‘a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of 
this Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if 
there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case’” (quoting Escambia Cnty. v. 
McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam))). 
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Taking into consideration several factors, the Court ultimately decided 
that Congress did not provide a clear enough statement evidencing its intent 
to regulate purely local conduct.  The Court explained that interpreting the 
statute to include Mrs. Bond’s conduct would be a “‘dramatic[] intru[sion] 
upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction.’”11 The Court found that, here, 
“ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the [statutory 
definition of] ‘chemical weapon,’” and thus, absent a “clear indication”12 
that Congress meant to reach local crimes, the statute cannot be read to do 
so.  The Court additionally argued that the reach of the statute is not as 
broad as it may at first appear, because despite the definition of “chemical 
weapon” within the statute, “[i]n settling on a fair reading of a statute, it is 
not unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term, particularly 
when there is dissonance between that ordinary meaning and the reach of 
the definition.”13  Compounded by the presence of other prosecutorial 
options14 and the federalism concern that the more expansive reading 
would intrude upon a traditional state police power,15 the Court required a 
clear statement that Congress meant to regulate this purely local conduct 
before reading the statute to reach the conduct here.16 
III. ANALYSIS 
It is important to begin with the plain text of the statute.  Section 
229(f)(1)(A) defines a “chemical weapon” as “[a] toxic chemical and its 
precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this 
chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a 
purpose.”17  A “toxic chemical,” for purposes of the statute, is  
any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can 
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
animals.  The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their 
origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they 
are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.18   
Section 229(a) provides that it is “unlawful for any person knowingly to 
develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, 
stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical 
weapon.”19  Given the straightforward nature of this language, Justice 
 
 11  Id. at 2088 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)). 
 12  Id. at 2090. 
 13  Id. at 2091. 
 14  Id. at 2092. 
 15  Id. at 2091–92. 
 16  Id. at 2093. 
 17  18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A) (2012). 
 18  Id. § 229F(8)(A). 
 19  Id. § 229(a)(1). 
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Scalia’s assertion that “[t]he meaning of the Act is plain”20 appears to be 
the more persuasive argument.  Looking at the facts of the case, though, the 
chemicals Mrs. Bond used did inflict a chemical burn on Ms. Haynes, and 
thus clearly seem to meet the statutory definition of “toxic chemicals.”  In 
turn, this means they satisfy the definition of a “chemical weapon” under 
the statute.  It would seem, then, that Mrs. Bond knowingly used the 
“chemical weapon” on the property of Ms. Haynes, for a purpose not 
protected under section 229F and therefore in violation of section 229(a).21 
Given that the language of the statute appears to be clear, it is odd the 
Court found it to be ambiguous.  The Court’s determination that the 
ordinary meaning of “chemical weapon” would not cover Mrs. Bond’s 
conduct may very well be true, but as Justice Scalia states, “[this is] beside 
the point, since the Act supplies its own definition of ‘chemical weapon,’ 
which unquestionably does bring Bond’s action within the statutory 
prohibition . . . . [T]he ordinary meaning of [chemical weapon] is 
irrelevant, because the statute’s own definition . . . is utterly clear.”22  
Justice Scalia quotes Stenberg v. Carhart for the proposition that “‘[w]hen 
a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, 
even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.’”23  With the clarity of 
the statutory definitions, the majority’s clear statement requirement seems 
to suggest that even when Congress clearly states the definition of the 
conduct it intends to reach, something more is needed.  It would now seem 
advisable for Congress in the future to make clarifying statements about the 
scope of any statutory announcement, given the Court’s concern for the 
“improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition.”24  Prior to this 
case, however, it did not seem to be necessary to do so to satisfy the clear 
statement rule.25 
Had the Court concluded that the statute, as written, reached Mrs. 
Bond’s conduct, the next step would have been to analyze whether the Act, 
as applied to her conduct, was constitutional.  The Court did not discuss 
this question, since the majority resolved the case via the clear statement 
rule.  The concurrences, however, did discuss this issue.  Justice Scalia 
 
 20  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 21  18 U.S.C. §§ 229F(7)(A)–(C) lists the purposes not prohibited by the statute, 
including peaceful, protective, military, and law enforcement purposes.   
 22  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 23  Id. (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000)).  The Court in Carhart 
also quoted several other cases which stand for the same principle.  See Meese v. Keene, 
481 U.S. 465, 484–85 (1987) (“It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term 
excludes unstated meanings of that term.”); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392–93 n.10 
(1979) (“As a rule, ‘a definition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any 
meaning that is not stated.’” (quoting 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1978)). 
 24  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 25  See id. at 2096. 
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disagrees with the government’s proposition that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,26 combined with the President’s Article II power to make treaties,27 
gives power to Congress to enact laws to execute treaties.28  Although 
Justice Scalia’s point that the Constitution does not distinguish between 
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is true,29 this was the result 
of neither an oversight nor conscious decision by the Framers.30  At the 
time of the drafting, treaties would have been understood to be self-
executing, and there was thus no need to distinguish between the two.31  
The difference “was introduced into U.S. jurisprudence by the Supreme 
Court in Foster v. Neilson . . . . [The Court] said only that treaties that 
‘operate of themselves’ are applicable by the courts without legislative 
implementation.  The Court’s qualification is the source of the distinction 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.”32  With that in 
mind, it seems at least plausible that the original combination, with only 
one type of treaty in mind, naturally led to Congress having the power to 
pass laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the power to make 
treaties which would have the force of law.  There was no need to provide a 
clearer distinction between making and carrying out the treaty, as making a 
treaty would have included carrying out its obligations. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause and treaty-making power, however, 
should also be sufficient on their own, barring other constitutional 
constraints, to permit Congress to pass laws carrying out the obligations of 
treaties.  It is necessary and proper for the making of treaties that the 
obligations of treaties be given the force of law.33  Without the assurance 
 
 26  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress has the power “[t]o make all [l]aws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into [e]xecution . . . all other [p]owers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer 
thereof”). 
 27  Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President “shall have [p]ower, by and with the [a]dvice 
and [c]onsent of the Senate, to make Treaties”). 
 28  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 29  Id. at 2099. 
 30  This summary does not intend to represent any original historical research, but 
instead relies on the prior work of other scholars.  
 31  Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 764 (1988) 
(“[M]ost of the Framers intended all treaties immediately to become binding on the whole 
nation, superadded to the laws of the land . . . .  In these ways at least, all treaties (to the 
extent of their grants, guarantees or obligations) were to be self-executing.”).  
 32  Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 695, 700–01 (1995); see id. at 700 n.27 (“The Foster self-execution holding was an 
alternative ground for denying relief.  Before reaching the self-execution issue, the Court 
held that the treaty was inapplicable . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).  See generally Foster 
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
 33  Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 76 (2014) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s reasoning “fails to 
account for the possibility that some treaties may require implementing legislation in order 
2015] B O N D  V .  U N I T E D  S T A T E S  73 
(and likelihood) of treaty obligations being enforced, the power to make 
treaties would be hindered.  Other nations would hesitate to make treaties 
with the United States if it was unable to trust that the United States would 
actually enforce the agreed upon terms.34  Missouri v. Holland35 was the 
most recent, prominent case prior to Bond in which the Supreme Court 
considered the treaty power.  Although Justice Scalia dismisses the Court’s 
single sentence36 from that opinion dealing with the treaty-implementing 
power as “unreasoned and citation-less,” his statement does not necessarily 
reflect the whole story.  Missouri’s brief “focused on challenging the scope 
of the treaty power and did not offer any clear separate challenge to 
Congress’ treaty-implementing power”37 because, at that time, 
“Congress’[] treaty-implementing power was uncontroversial.  It had a 
straightforward textual basis in the Necessary and Proper Clause combined 
with the Treaty Clause . . . [and it] had the sanction of historical practice in 
the political branches and the approval of leading commentators . . . .”38  In 
this context, it no longer seems as odd that the issue of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause did not receive a more in-depth treatment in Missouri.  
Furthermore, separating the power to make treaties from Congress’ power 
to carry out the obligations of the treaty is not as simple as Justice Scalia 
makes it seem. 
Justice Scalia based the second portion of his concurrence on the 
structure of the Constitution and notions of enumerated and separated 
powers.39  He seemed concerned with the possibility of the government 
utilizing the treaty power to regulate areas which it normally could not, 
 
to be ‘made’—that is, to be ratified or to enter into force. . . . [H]istorically, U.S. practice 
sometimes required that the implementation of treaties occur prior to their ratification or 
entry into force”). 
 34  Id. at 76–77 (“[T]his reasoning does not account for the possibility that 
implementing legislation might in fact facilitate the making of treaties. . . . [B]asic accounts 
of treaty negotiation . . . recognize that treaty negotiators take the likelihood of compliance 
into account and may demand stiffer terms or decline to negotiate with countries known to 
have past difficulties complying with treaties.” (citing Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of 
International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 596 (2005) (explaining that when a state 
with past compliance problems “seeks to enter into agreements in the future, its potential 
partners will take into account the risk that the agreement will be violated, and will be less 
willing to offer concessions of their own in exchange for promises from that country.  If 
there is enough suspicion, potential partners may simply refuse to deal with the state”))). 
 35  252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 36  Id. at 432 (stating that “there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute 
under Article I, § 8 as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the 
Government”). 
 37  Galbraith, supra note 33, at 108–09. 
 38  Id. at 108.  See generally id. at 81–108 (reviewing the historical development of the 
treaty-implementing power prior to Missouri v. Holland). 
 39  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2099–100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).   
74 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 90:2 
rendering it “one treaty away from acquiring a general police power.”40  
Although there has been some argument for the treaty power having no 
limitations on subject matter,41 others, including Justice Thomas in his 
concurring opinion, advocate for a “domestic concern” limitation.42  Justice 
Scalia’s concern that the treaty power could be used for the creation of 
pretextual treaties also appears to be a problem with a solution.  The 
powers being discussed here are a combination of the treaty power and 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  It is here the oft-quoted words of Justice 
Marshall pertaining to the Necessary and Proper Clause come to mind: “Let 
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which 
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional.”43  If the government—with, as in this case, the 
acquiescence of the President, two-thirds of the Senate, and the passage of 
a statute by the Congress—conspired to create a pretextual treaty to 
overrule a decision of the Supreme Court, it would be a situation wherein 
the end would be illegitimate, outside the scope of the Constitution, and the 
means both inappropriate and not plainly adapted.  Such a law would be 
unconstitutional and would fail. 
If one considers the political safeguards of federalism to be a 
functioning check on the national government in any way, the process for a 
non-self-executing treaty appears to be the most stringent—outside of the 
amendment process—and yet, is still able to be repealed by the same 
process as other statutes.  Requiring the approval of both the President and 
two-thirds of the Senate, then having the domestic component undergo 
bicameralism and presentment, provides perhaps the best opportunity for 
political safeguards to work.  Although the power of non-self-executing 
treaties creates concern, self-executing treaties are more worrisome because 
they are not required to go through bicameralism and presentment.  The 
need for congressional action should be seen as beneficial, allowing 
Congress to craft laws which comply with the treaty but also represent the 
concerns of their constituents.44  That is not to say there should be no limits 
on the treaty power once combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 
 40  Id. at 2101. 
 41  See id. at 2100 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 191, 197 (2d ed. 1996)).  But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 433–39 (2000). 
 42  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).  This limitation will be 
discussed infra. 
 43  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 44  Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 403, 437 (2003) (stating that the Founders “took special steps to ensure that the treaty 
power would not be used to abuse state interests”); see also id. at 437 n.138 (“Ordinary 
legislation requires [Presidential agreement or a two-thirds supermajority] . . . . The 
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As discussed previously, the restrictions on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause should already provide some restrictions on Congress’ use of the 
treaty power.45  Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, brings up the potential 
limit of domestic concerns.46  After reviewing the history of the Treaty 
Power through statements from the Founders47 and caselaw,48 Justice 
Thomas concludes that although “the distinction between matters of 
international intercourse and matters of purely domestic regulation may not 
be obvious in all cases[,] . . . hypothetical difficulties in line-drawing are no 
reason to ignore a constitutional limit,” positing to “draw a line that 
respects the original understanding of the Treaty Power.”49  There are 
different ways to draw the line between domestic and international affairs.  
Professor Curtis Bradley discusses two main ways that this “subject matter 
limitation” could be read.50  The first aligns with Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence and limits the treaty power to matters that have international 
effects.51  The second limits the power to those matters that need 
“international cooperation in order to be addressed.”52  The problem with 
the first understanding is that, given the interconnectedness of nations in 
the modern world, “almost any issue can plausibly be labeled 
‘international.’”53  The second understanding is subject to similar issues, 
though it appears to be consistent with the decision in Holland, in which 
the limitation required that the nations involved agree on a cooperative 
approach.54  There is a concern about the ability of the courts to draw this 
line in a consistent, applicable way,55 but the difficulty should not 
 
significance of that difference turns in part on the Senate’s value in protecting state 
prerogatives.” (citing Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 
VA. J. INT’L L. 713, 722 (2002))). 
 45  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 46  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 47  Id. at 2103–08 (“The postratification theory and practice of treaty-making 
accordingly confirms the understanding that treaties by their nature relate to intercourse with 
other nations . . . rather than to purely domestic affairs.”).  
 48  Id. at 2108–10 (“[T]he holding in Holland is consistent with the understanding that 
treaties are limited to matters of international intercourse.  The Court observed that the 
treaty at issue addressed migratory birds that were ‘only transitorily within the State and 
ha[d] no permanent habitat therein.’” (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 
(1920))). 
 49  Id. at 2110. 
 50  Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
390, 451–56 (1998). 
 51  Id. at 452–53. 
 52  Id. at 453. 
 53  Id. at 451–52. 
 54  Id. at 453.  
 55  Id. 
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necessarily mean the courts disregard this potential limit, as Justice Thomas 
asserted.56 
Others suggest that the treaty power distinction between domestic and 
international is not really a workable distinction,57 and there are other 
constitutional constraints that might apply.58  This case in particular 
presented an odd situation in light of the government’s decision not to 
argue that the Commerce Clause supported its enactment.  However, due to 
the purely local, criminal nature of Mrs. Bond’s conduct, it seems that this 
is an instance where the Court could have made clear what is not 
“international.” 
CONCLUSION 
Although the majority’s outcome was correct, the application of the 
clear statement rule in this situation seems incorrect.  The majority 
misconstrues the statute not to reach Mrs. Bond’s conduct when it should 
have done so.  The concurrences properly assert that despite the conduct 
here falling within the clear definition of the statute, the Court should have 
reversed the conviction on constitutional grounds.  As a result of this 
decision, Congress should now plan to make clarifying statements about 
the scope of the statute in order to avoid the clear statement problem 
identified here.   
 Separately, although only dicta, Justice Scalia’s assertion that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause does not extend beyond the “making” of 
treaties does not seem correct.  It appears necessary and proper for the 
making of treaties that the power to execute be implied, and the non-self-
executing treaty was a later judicial invention that the original language 
could not have taken into account.  However, Justice Thomas’s use of the 
domestic and international matter distinction appears to be a useful limit on 





 56  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 57  See Symposium, The Treaty Power After Bond v. United States: Interpretative and 
Constitutional Constraints, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).  
 58  Bradley, supra note 50, at 456–61 (“[T]here is a strong case—based on history, 
doctrine, and policy—for subjecting the treaty power to the same federalism limitations that 
apply to Congress’s legislative powers.”). 
 59  See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text.  
